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THE STANDARD OIL DECISION; THE RULE

A

OF REASON.

FTER twenty-one years the Sherman Anti Trust Act has been
applied to the typical combination restraining interstate commerce, which that 'act was designed to prevent.
Ini the debate in the United States Senate, on the original bill
introduced by SENATOR SHeRMAN, he said:'a
"Associated enterprise and capital are not satisfied with partnerships and corporations competing with each other, and have invented
a new form of combination, commonly called trusts, that seeks to
avoid competition by combining the controlling corporations, pArtnerships, and individuals engaged in the same business, and placing 'the power and properfy of the combination under the government of a few individuals, and often under the control of a
single man called a trustee, a chairman or a president. The sole
object of .such a combination is-,to make competition impossible.
It can control the market, raise or lower prices, as will best promote its selfish interests, reduce prices in a particular. locality and
break down competition and advknce prices at will where competition does 'iot exist. Its governing motive is to increase the
profits of the.parties comprising it. The law of selfishness, uncontrolled by "competition, compels it to disregard the interests of the
consfimer. It dictates terms to transportation companies, it commands the price of labor without fear of strikes, for in its field it
allows no competitors. Such a combination is far more dangerous
than any heretofore invented, and, when it embraces the great body
of' all the corporations engaged in a .particular industry in all of the
states of the Union, it tends to advance the price to the consumer
I See Congressional Record, Vol. 2!, Mat.. 2z, xSgo; Bills and Debates in Congress
relating to trusts, x888-x99d, pp. 9S-6. There are many other references to the Standard Oil Co. in the debates: Allison, p. 126; Teller, p. 170; Wilson, p. 337.
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of any article produced, it is a substantial monopoly injurious to the
public, and, by the rule of both the common and the civil law, is
null and void and the just subject of restraint by the courts, of forfeiture of corporate rights and privileges, and in some cases should
be denounced as a crime, and the individuals engaged in it should
be punished as criminals. It is this kind of a combination we have
to deal with now."
"Do I exaggerate the evil we have to deal with? I do not think
so. I do not wish to single out any particular trust or combination.
It is not a particular trust, but the system I aim at. I will only
cite a very few instances of combinations that have been. the subject of judicial or legislative inquiry, to show what has been and
what can be done by them," as follows:
In Handy v. C. & M. R. R. Co., 31 Fed. 689, 693. "The Standard
Oil Co. and, George Rice were competitors in the business of refining
oil; the Standard desired to crush Rice and his business, and under
threat of building a pipe line, compelled the receiver of the iailroad
to carry its oil at io cents per barrel and charge Rice 35 cents per
barrel for a like service, and pay the Standard 25 cents out of the
35 cents thus exacted from Rice."
"It also appears" in an equity suit in Pennsylvania v. Penn. R. R.
(1879), "by testimony of A. J. Cassatt, that the Standard Oil Company were receiving rebates of 49c per bbl. on crude oil from Brad- ford Oil region to tide water, 5I 2C from the lower oil region to tide
water, and 64y2 c from Cleveland to tide water,"--or "the annual illegal receipts by the Standard Oil Co. would have been $5,48o,oo."

"I do not wish to single out the Standard Oil Company. * * * I only
refer to them -because they are the oldest of these combinations
founded upon contracts which have been copied by the other corporations." 2 "Sir, how the people of the United States as well as
of other countries are feeling the power and grasp of these combinations, and are demanding of every legislature and of Congress
a remedy for this evil, only grown into huge proportions in recent
times. They had monopolies and mortmains of old, but never
before such giants as in our day. You must heed their appeal or
the Nihilist. Society
be ready for -the Socialist, the Communist, and
'3
is now disturbed by forces never felt before."
The Supreme Court of the United-States has now-after these
4
21 years,-decided that the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey,
is an unlawful combination in restraint of interstate and foreign
commerce, in violation of the Federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act of
2lb. Mar. 24, x8go; Bills & Debates, p. 167.
3 lb. Bills & Debates, p. iol.
'United States v. Standard Oil Co.. - U. S. -,

(May 1S, 19z).
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i89o. The court's decision to this effect is unanimous, affirming
5
the unanimous decision of the Circuit Court.
Act makes only conAnti-Trust
the
The court ruled: (i) That
tracts and combinations in unreasonable restraint of interstate and
foreign trade and. commerce illegal, and (2) that the Standard Oil
Co. of New- Jersey is such a combination.

Chief Justice WHITE

writes the opinion, Mr. Justice HARLAN vigorously dissenting on the
first proposition. Whether all the other justices concur in the
result only, or also upon the first proposition, is not definitely stated
in the reports received; but that a majority of the court concurs on
the first proposition is indicated by the words of the Chief Justice
that if there are statements in former decisions inconsistent with
this, "they are necessarily now limited and qualified."
The Court had no difficulty in unanimously finding from the facts,
that the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey was a combination in
unreasonable restraint of interstate commerce. The Circuit Court
also had no difficulty in so unanimously finding. Hence, there was
no question before the court requiring it to decide that the Antitrust Act applied only to combinations in unreasonable restraint of
interstate commerce, and it seems unusual for the court in a case
where such a question is not involved to overrule tNo prior de&isions
where such a question was directly and necessarily involved and
passed upon.
The facts are generally known and voluminous (23 volumes,
12000 pages), yet a summary is proper to show how unnecessary
it was for the court in -this case to announce the first proposition.
The following, gleaned from various sources, but more than confirmed by the record in the case, will make this clear:
Oil wa§ "struck" -by boring in 1858, in Northwestern Pennsylvania, near Titusville, about 25 miles from Corry, Union City, and
Meadville, 125 miles from Cleveland, and 170 from Pittsburg by
rail. The Pennsylvania road reached Corry and Union City, and
from the latter connected with the Lake Shore, 25 miles away, at
Erie; the Erie road ran through Corry, Union City and Meadville.
In 1863 the Oil Creek railroad reache.d Titusville and Oil City from
Corry, and the Erie road built to Franklin; in i868 the Lake Shore,
completed a line to Oil City. By i868 successful pipe lines, storage
reservoirs, and transferable oil certificates were in use. The first
refinery had been built in 1862, in which the processes yet in use were
employed. In 1865 Mr. J. D. Rockefeller went into the refining
businecs at Cleveland. In 1867 he took in his brother William and
H. M. Flagler. In i868 Mr. Rockefeller represented to General
5 173 Fed. 177; x52 Fed. 290.
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Devereux, Vice-President. of the Lake Shore road, that building
refineries at the oil regions would ruin -the Cleveland refineries, and
,destroy the oil traffic of the road; a rebate of 15 cents per barrel
from the 40 cent rate on the crude oil from the fields was made' to
Mr.. Rockefeller, and he agreed to fight- it out with the oil region
refineries.6 In 1870, the Standard Oil Co. of Ohio was formed by
Mr. Rockefeller and his associates with a capital stock of $i,ooo,ooo,
7
and their refining capacity was 6oo barrels of crude oil daily -the
production of all the 15o refineries of the country being 15,0oo bar-

rels daily." Some of the railroad officials became stockholders in the
Standard Oil Co. 'In 1871 (May 6) the South Improvement Co.
was chartered in Pennsylvania, with very broad powers; this vasbrought to Mr. Rockefeller's attention as early as.October, 1871,10 and
he, and four other Standard Oil Co. members, took 1,375 shares of
the 2,000 of its stock, and Peter Watson, freight agent of- the Lake
Shore, took IOO more. 1 The company was organized, Watson made
president, and January i8, 1872, a contract was entered into with
the railroads, signed by the presidents or managers, whereby oil
rates were to be doubled, and the South Improvement Co. was to
have rebates (40 cents out of 8o cents on crude oil to Cleveland,
$I.O6 out of $2.56 to New York) on crude oil shipped by it, and 50
cents out of $2.00 on refined, from Cleveland to New York; and in
addition to these rebates, the South Improvement Co. was to have
drawbacks to the same amount on all oil shipped 'by all. other shippers; the rate from the oil fields to New York, 125 miles nearer
than Cleveland, was made $2.92--or 92 cents higher; the railroads
agreed to furnish all way bills of all oil shipped by any one and open
their books to them (the Improvement Co.) and do everything they.
could to insure them- "against loss or injury by competition." February 12 the Standard increased its stock to $2,50Q,000, and Mr.
Rockefeller proceeded to Cleveland, and told thie thirty refineries
there that if they didn't sell their property to him it would be value2,
less-that there was a combination of railroad, and oil men.' The
result was that of the thirty refineries all but four or five sold out at
3
from 45 to 65 per cent of their value.' The premature putting into
0Miss

Tarbell, McClure, Nov., X902, and following.
7 Indus. Corn. R., 6o6. 689.
3 lb., 547, 626, 647.
J Ib., 6o6, 645, 69o, 694, 703.
10Ib., 691.
11lb., 69o.
2 Indus. Corn. R., 692, 644.
and
!31,.. 66, 644, 648, 692; 43 0. S., 581; Miss Tarbell, McClure, Nov., x9o'2,
following.
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effect of this contract, February 26, almost led to riots" in the oil
regions, and the railroads were obliged to abrogate it, and there followed legislative investigations and the repeal of the charter, March
25, 1872.

A new contract was made with "perfect equality to all

shippers," which didn't last two weeks, and it soon became apparent
'that the railroads "were doing for the- Standard secretly just what
"they had publicly contracted to do for the South Improvement Co."' 15
The details are obscure in some places. The result, however, was
perfectly apparent. The Standard first acquired control of the local
pipe lines, by means of drawbacks of "22'cents per barrel allowed to
the Standard lines-and the other local.lines "died off like sheep." 1
In 1875, lower rates were given .the Standard on western shipments,
by allowing them to ship tank cars averaging ioo barrels and billing
them at 8o "barrels, and, although the tariff rates were charged, "ac.ording to some -prearranged method," a portion was refunded
under the names of "drawbacks" or "rebates. '17 This contract lasted
'till I883." To enable the Standard to acquire a competing pipe line
the New York Central made a rate netting ii cents to the Standard,
when the open rate was $Y.9o from Cleveland to New York.' 9 In
1878, the Standard, stating they had regularly received 35 cents
* commission per barrel from the New York Central, and 2o cents
from the Erie, demandet 2o cents per barrel from the Pennsylvania

on alloil shipped by these roads, and Mr. Cassatt granted it "after
seeing the receipted bills" from the other roads. This amounted 'on
- the Pennsylvania alone,, in two months, to $68,753.
It had been
in existence since October 17, 1877, on the other roads.20 Another
* contract gave a Standard Oil Terminal Company 222 cents "on all
oil transpoted"by the'Pennsylvania Co.21 In these ways, by 1879, the
Standard had obtained not only.control of the local pipe lines, but
also the 'terminal facilities of the four trunk lines at Philadelphia,
Baltimore and New York;22 and had obtained control of

90

or 95

per cent of'the refining business -of the "country,23 and, according to
tlje Hepburn )Cdmmittee, "the parties who have been driven to the
wall have had 'ample capital and. equal ability in the prosecution
1" 13 Indus. Com. R.q 641.

1
Indus. Corn. R.. 385-1.
1 x Indus. Corn. R.. 386. 388. 64!. 696. 697.
1743 G. S., 571, 583.4, from 'inding of,taqts by, eial court.

"lb.-

'

'

•
Indus. C. R., 263, tz3, 696, 713.
0lb., 387. Ilb., 387, 696.
2213 -Indus. C. R., 643.
"-2 Indus.-C. R.,-646. 647.
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of their bupiness in2' 4all things save their ability to acquire facilities
for transportation. "

Similar discriminations -by railroad companies in favor of the
Standard Oil Co., or of some of its numerous affiliated companies
had practically continued to the time of bringing the suit in this case.
In 1879, a secret trust agreement was entered into by the 37
stockholders of the Standard Oil Company of Ohio, whereby the
stocks of 30 separate competing companies, were turned over to
trustees to hold control and manage for the benefit of the stockholders of the Standard. This was superseded in 1882 by the Stafidard Oil Trust composed of trustees. Forty corporations (including
those of 1879) were taken in, their $56,000,000 of capital stock be-

ihg exchanged by their stockholders with the trustees for $70,000,000

trust certificates. In the ten years after 1882, the stocks of 78 more
companies were'acquired, but 50 refineries had been dismantled in
the meantime; $12,000,000 more trust certificates had been issued
for these properties and $15,ooo,ooo more issued as a stock divi-.

dend, making $97,250,000 trust certificates outstanding against prop-

erty valued at $67,936,000. In March, 1892, the Supreme Court of
Ohio declared the Trust illegal and -Ordered its dissolution. =5 At
this time the stocks of 84 companies were held by the trustees.
The trustees of the trust appointed themselves liquidating trustees
and proceeded to liquidate in the following way: The stock of 23
of th-ese companies was transferred to the Standard Oil Co. of New
'Jersey ; that of I I other companies to the Standard Oil Co. of New
.York; that of I I other companies to the Anglo-American Oil Co. of
England; and that of 19 other companies to 7 other corporations,
leaving the stock of 20 other companies in the hands of the trustees
for distribution; and these 20 companies by stock ownership controlled all of the others which had been in the hands of the trustees;
since there vere 972500 trust certificates of $ioo each the trustees
offered to each holder of one trust certificate 1/972500 of the stock
of A -the 20 companies that owned the stocks of the other 64 companies; by the end of the year 494619 trust certificates (a bare majority of "all) had been exchanged by the trustees with themselves
and their ,immediate associates, for their proportional amounts
of the stocks in the 20 companies thereby giving them the control of these companies, and besides leaving the balance of the
trust certificates in their hands. During the next 6 years only two
more shares of trust certificates were exchanged; in the meantime
dividends were regularly declared upon the outstanding trust certifiIndus. C. R., 654.
-1State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137.

24 39
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cates, and exactly enough to pay these was collected by the trustees
from the income of the sub-companies. In 1897, the Attorney General of -Ohio filed contempt proceedings against the Standard Oil
Co., for not in good faith dissolving the trust, but on the testimony
of Mr. Rockefeller and other high officials of the company, that this
had been done in good faith and that the 20 companies were competing, this case was dismissed. However, within a month after
filing the suit a large amount of trust certificates was turned in and
stock of the sub-companies issued; and in 1899 the Standard Oil
Company of New Jersey was reorganized, with a capital stock of
$ioo,ooo,ooo, with the power to do all the kinds of business done
by all the sub-companies, with the same by-laws as those of the
trust, and with the liquidating trustees as directors; the balance of
the trust certificates were liquidated at once; all of the shares of the
20 sub-companies were then turned over by the shareholders (several thousand in number), to the Standard Oil Company of New
Jersey, and exactly 972500 shares of its stock were issued to such
shareholders, and thereby when the Governmeit brought its suit
the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey o~vned directly the stock
of 65 sub-companies, which in turn owned the stock of 49 others;
and of the 972500 shares of the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey,
the liquidating trustees and their immediate business associates, own
over 5ooooo shares; the par value of the shares is $ioo; the market
value at the time of the decision was $672, and has been as high as
$843; and for many years dividends from 30 to 48 per cent have
been paid.
Upon the first proposition,-that the anti-trust act applies only to
contracts and combinations in unreasonable restraint of trade, the
Chief Justice insists that "conti~acts in restraint of trade," in the
statute means only such as were by the common law in unreasonable
restraint of trade, as known and understood at the time the law was
passed. In so holding he reiterates substantially what he said in his
dissenting opinion in United States v. Freight Association. This was the suit brought- by the Government to dissolve the
Trans-Missouri Freight Association, organized for the purpose of
"maintaining just and reasonable rates, preventing unjust discriminations, by furnishing adequate and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between the several lines, without preventing or
illegally limiting competition." The case was heard on the pleadings, and the answer stating the above facts was admitted to be
true. The district court, RIMR, J., held that such an agreement did
1 66 U.

S. 335.
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not violate, the Anti-trust Act.

7

This was affirmed by the Circuit

Court of Appeals, SANBORM and THAYvR, JJ., SHiRAs, J., dissent8
.I
ing.2
In the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice PZCKE AM (WHITi-, Fi w,
GRAY, SriaAs, JJ., -dissenting), delivered ,the opinion, and said:

"What is the meaning of the language'as used in the Statute, that
'every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,-or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
states or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal?' Is it,,
confined to a contract or combination which is only in unreasonable.
restraint of trade or commerce, or does it include what the language
of the act plainly and in terms covers, all contracts of that nature.
* *-* *It

is now with much amplification of argument urged that

the statute, in,declaring illegal every combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of tiade or commerce,,
does not mean what the language used therein plainly imports; but
that it only means. to declare illegal any such contract which is in
unreasonable restraint of trade, while leaving all others unaffected
by the provisions of the act; that the common law meaning 9f th6
term "contract in restraint of trade," 'includes only such contracts
as are in unreagonable restraint of trade, and "when that term is
used in the Federal statute it is not intended to include all contracts
'inrestraint of trade, but only those which are in unreasonable restrairit thereof." This is exactly the holding of SANBORN and
THAYER, JJ., in the Court of Appeals. "
Justice PtCKIIAM continues: "The term -is not of such limited
signification, contracts in restraint of. trade have been known and'
spoken, of for hundreds of years both in England and.in this country,
and -the term includes all kinds of those contracts which in fact restrain or may restrain trade. Some of such contfacts have been
held void anid unenforceable in the courts by reason of their restraint being unreasonable, while others have been held valid because
they were niot of that nature.. A contract'may be in restraint of
trade and still be valid at common law. Althoufgh valid, it is nevertheless a contract in restraint of trade, and would be so described

either at common law or elsewhere. By the simple.use of the term
'contract ir4restraint of trade,' all contracts of that nature, whether
valid or otherwise, would be included, and not alone that kind of
contract which, was invalid and unenforceable as being in unreasonable restraint of trade. When, therefore, the body of the act pro.
nounces as illegal every contract or combination in restraint of
'U. S. v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n (x892), 53 Fed. 440.
2sU. S. v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n (893), 58 Fed. 58:
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trade or commerce among the several states, the plain and ordinary
meaning of such language is n6t limited to that kind of contract
alone which is in unreasonable restraint of trade, but all contracts
are included in such language, and no exception or limitation can
be added without placing in the act that which has been omitted by
Congress."
In United States v. Joint Trffic Ass n, " the fats were similar and
a reconsideration of the holding in the Trans-Missouri case was
asked, on the ground that the Anti-trust Act, if it made "every contract in restraint of interstate commerce" illegal, the act was then
unconstitutional as depriving persons of 'their liberty without due
process of law. The court, however; overruled this, and reaffirmed
the view taken in the Trans-Missour! case. Mr. Justice PECKHAM
again delivered the opinion of the court, and GRAY, SiiRAs, and
WHITE, JJ., dissented.,
The same constitutional point was affirmed in Addyston Pipe and
Steel Co. v. U. S.,-10 and also in Montague & Co.. v. Lowrie,3' Mr.
Justice PECKHAii delivering-the obinions in bbth cases.
In Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., '2 the question was again
raised, Justices HARLAN,. BROWN, MCKENNA and DAY holding that
the Anti-trust Act "embraces all direct restraints, reasonable or unreasonable." In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice BREWrR, however, said of the preceding Traffic Association and other cases, "Instead of holding that the Anti-trust Act included all contracts reasonable or unreasonable, in testraint of interstate trade, the ruling
should 'have been that the contracts there presented were unreasonable restraints of interstate trade, and as such within the scope of
the act. * * * Congress'did not intend to reach and destroy those
minor contracts in -partial.restraint of trade which the long course
of decisions at common law hdd affirmed were reasonable and ought
to be upheld." In this case FuLLER, ,C. J., WITE, PEcKHAM,
HOLmEs, JJ., dissented on the ,ground that. "the acquisition and
ownership of stock in competing railroads, organized -under, state
law, by several persons or by corporations, is not interstate commerce, and, therefore, not subjectto the cbntrol of Congress." But
in Loewe v. Lawlor,33 Chief.Justice FuLIIER speaking for the whole
court without dissent, citing the foregoing cases says (p. 297), they
"'hold in effect that' the' Anti-irust law has a brbader application than
the prohibition-of restraihts of trade unlawful at common law."
21171 U. S. 556.

- 17S U. S. 228.
n 193 U. . 38.
2193 U. S. 197.

'32o8 U. S. 274.
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The road Chief Justice Wiirm travels in reaching the
conclusion
that only unreasonable restraint is forbidden is:
"The text of the first and second sections of the act is:
"'Section i. Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise or conspiracy,. in restraint of trade or commerce, among
the several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be
illegal. * * * "

" 'Section 2. Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to
monopolize or combine or conspire with any person or persons to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the sevet-al.
states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. * * *"

"The debates show that doubt as to whether there was a common
law of the United States which governed the subject in the absence
of legislation was among the influences leading to the passage of
the act. They conclusively show, however, that the main cause which
led to the legislation was the thought * * * that combinations
known as trusts were being multiplied, and the widespread impression that their power had been and would be exerted to oppress
individuals and injure the public generlly."
"The sole subject with which the first section deals is restraint of'
trade, as therein contemplated, and the attempt to monopolize is the
subject with which the second section is concerned. It is certain
that those'terms, at least in their rudimentary meaning, took their
origin in the common law and were familiar in the law of this
country prior to and at the time of the adoption of the act in question."
"It is certain that at a remote period the words contract in restraint of trade in England came to refer to some voluntary restraint
put by'contract by an individual on his right to carry on his trade
or calling. Originally all such contracts were considered to be
illegal, because it was deemed they were injurious to the public as
well as to the individual§ who made them. In the interest of freedom of individuals to contract this doctrine was modified so that it
was only when a restraint by contract was so general as to be coterminous with the kingdom that it was treated as void. That is to
say, if the restraint was partial in its operation and was otherwise
reasonable the contract was held to he valid."
"Monopolies were defined by Lord CoiK as follows: 'A monopoly is an institution, or allowance by the king by his grant, com* mission, or otherwise to any person or persons, bodies politic or
corporation, of or for the sole buying, selling, 'making, working, or
using of any thing, whereby any person or persons, bodies politic or
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corporate are sought to be restrained of any freedom or liberty that
they had before, or hindered in their lawful trade.' "
"As monopoly, as thus conceived, embraced only a consequent
arising from an exertion of sovereign power, no express restrictions
or prohibitions obtained against the creation by an individual of a
monopoly as such."
"But as it was considered, at least so far as.tle necessaries of life
were concerned, that individuals by the abuse of their right of contract miglht be able to usurp the power arbitrarily to enhance prices,
one of the wrongs arising from monopoly; it came to be that laws
were passed relating to offenses such as forestalling and engrossing,
by which prohibitions were placed upon the power of individuals
to deal under such circumstances and conditions as * * * to give
rise to the presumption of an intent to injure others through the
means of a monopolistic increase of prices."
Hence, "the prohibited act of engrossing, because of its inevitable
accomplishmerit of one of the evils demed to be engendered by
monopoly, came to be referred to isbeing a monopoly or constituting an attempt to monopolize."
"From the development of more accurate economic conceptions
and the changes in conditions of society it came to be recognized
that the acts prohibited by the engrossing, forestalling, etc., statutes
did not have the harmful tendency which they were presumed to
have when the legislation concerning them was enacted," and so such
1'
acts were repealed in England in 1844.
"By an early statute of the Province .of Massachusetts,1778-I779,
monopoly and forestalling were expressly treated as one and the same.
It is also true that the principles concerning contracts in restraint of
trade, thaf is voluntary restrairit put by a person on his, right to
pursu& his calling, came generally to be recognized in accordance
with the English rule. It came, moreover to pass that contracts or
acts which it was considered bact a monop6listit tendency, especially
those W~hich Were.thought to unduly diminish competition and hence
to enhance prices-in other words, to mQnopolize-came 'also in a
generic sense to be spoken of and treated as they hiad been in England, as restricting the due course of trade, and therefore as being
in restraint of trade."
"Without, going into detail and but briefly surveying the whole
field, it may be with accuracy, said that the dread of enhancement
of prices and of other wrongs which, it was thought, would flow
from the undue limitation of competitive conditions taused by contracts or other acts of individuals or corporations, led as a matter
of public policy, to the prohibition or treating as illegal of contracts
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or acts which were unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions, either from the nature or character of the contract or act,
or where the surrounding circumstances were such as to justify the
conclusion, they had not been .entered into or performed with the
legitimate purpose of reasonably forwarding personal interest and
developing'trade, 'but on the contrary were of such a character as to
give rise to the inference or presumption that they had been entered
into or done with the intent to do wrong to the general public, and
to limit the right of individuals, thus restraining the free flow of
commerce. and tending to bring about the evils, such as enhancement.
of prices, which were considered to be against public policy."
"In view of the common law and the law in this country as to
restraint of trade, which we have reviewed, we.think it results," as
to the first section:
"[a]. That the context.manifests that the statute was diawn in
the light of. the existing practical conception of the law of restraint
of trade."
"[b]. That in view of the many new forms of contracts and combinations which were being evolved from existing economic conditions, it was deemed essential by an ill embfacing enumeration to
make sure thIat no form of contract 'or combination by which an
undue restraint of interstate or foreign commerce was brought
about could save such restraint from condemnation."
"[-]. And as the contracts or acts embraced in 'the provision
'were not 6xpressly defined, since the enumeration addressed itself
to classes 'broad enough to embrace every conceivable contract or
combination which could be made concerning trade or commerce or
the subjects of such commerce, and thus cau'sed any act done by
any of the enumerated methods anywhere in the whole field of
human activity to be illegal if in restraint of trade, it inevitably follows that the provision necessarily called for the exercise of judgment which required that some standakd should be resorted to for
the purpose of determining whether the prohibitions contained iti
the statute had or had not in any given case been violated. Thus
not specifying, but indubitably contemplating' and requiring a standard, it follows that it was intended that the standard of reason which
had been applied to the common law and in this country in dealing
with subjects of the character- embraced by the statute was intended
to be the measure used for the purpose of determining whether in a
given case a particular act had or had not brought about the wrong.
against which the statute provided."
"And a consideration of the text of the second section serves to
establish that it was intended to supplement the first and to make
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sure that by. no possible guise could the public policy embodied in
the first section be frustrated or evaded if possible, to make the prohibitions of the act all the more complete and perfect by embracing
all attempts to reach the end prohibited by the first section; that is,
restraints of trade, by any attempt to monopolize or monopolization
thereof, even though the acts by which such results are attempted
to be brought about or are brought about be not embraced within
the general enpmeration of the first section.
"And, of course, when the second section is thus harmonized with
and made, as it was intended to be, the complement of the first, it
becomes obvious that the criteria to be resorted to in any given case
for the purpose of ascertaining whether violations of the section
have been committed, is the rule of reason, guided by the established
law and by the plain duty to enforce the prohibitions of the act,
and thus the public policy which its restrictions were obviously
enacted to subserve."
In dissenting from this view Mr. Justice HARLAN says: "There
are some things in this opinion, and some that are to result from
this opinion, which I think may very well alarm thoughtful men, or
many thoughtful men; and I am unwilling to let them pass with
any idea that I approve them.
"The anti-trust act of i89o was passed at a time when this country
was in a state of great unrest, arising out of enormous aggregation
of capital-in a few hands, and arising out of combinations which
had their hands upon the throat of this country in respect even to
the necessities of life; and Congress had before it the great question as to how these evils were to be remedied, so far as Congress
had the power to remedy them. The question was: What shall
we do? They finally, after great "debate by able statesmen, passed
the anti-trust act of 189o. It provides in section i, 'That ev'ery contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy not in
restraint of trade, as the learned chief justice said in one part of his
remarks, but * * * in restraint of trade among the several states
and with foreign nations is hereby declared to be illegal.'
"Congress has nothing to do with domestic trade in the states,
but as to interstate trade it has a great deal to do, and therefore it
fell upon this policy.
"The men who were in the Congress of the United States at that
time knew w1at the common law was about the restraint 6-f trade.
They knew what restraints of trade at common law were lawful and
what were unlawful. But Congress said:
"The surest way to protect interstate commerce is not to start
upon any distinctions at all as to the kinds of trade; 'every? contract

MICIIGAN LAW REVIEW

in restraint of trade among the states is hereby declared to be illegal.
"Then, in the second section:
"'Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize'-'donopolize what? 'Any part of interstate trade or commerce
shall be liable to the penalties prescribed by this act.' What becomes, then, of the statement that this act did not condemn monopoly-in itself? Did not these men know what a monopoly was?
And when Congress said that we will punish any man who monopolizes or attempts to monopolize any part of interstate commerce,
did it not know what it intended? That is not all: 'Every. contract,
combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint
of trade or commerce among the states, is hereby declared illegal.
"Therefore Congress said to all the people of this country: 'We
are not going to bother the courts or ourselves with any inquiries as
to what contracts are in restraint of trade, reasonably or unreasonably. We are not going to leave that to any jury. We " re not
going to leave that to any circuit judge. We will determine it as
a part of the policy of the United States, that, so far as interstate
trade is concerned, nobody or corporation shall make or attempt
to enforce a contract, any contract, that in 'any degree restrains
interstate trade.'

Can anybody doubt the meaning of those words?

* * * What occurred next? Look at this, step by step, and I shall'
get directly, to the part of this opinion that I say may well alarm
the country, notwithstanding the many good things tlaat are in it,
magnificently said.
"In 1896, fifteen years ago, a case was in this court known as the
Trans-Missouri case. The question involved the construction as to
the scope and meaning of that anti-trust law. Who was here to
instruct the court 6n that occasion? We hear a good deal about
the 'lamp of reason.' We hear that the time has come when we
should hold up the light of reason and look at this act; as if the men
of that day, freshly after the passage of the act, were moving about
in darkness and did not know what they were doing or saying.
They were, At"Let us see who were the men in the case.
Dillon, James
F.
John
Guthrie,
torney General Harmon, W. F.
G. JohnJohn
and
Bowers,
W.
Lloyd
C. Carter, Edward J.,Phelps,
case, inthis
from
extensively
quotes
then
HARLAN
son." Justice
Joint
the
from
quotes
also
He
above.
given
quotations
the
cluding
Traffic case, showing that that gase reaffirmed the Trans-Missouri
case after the fullest argument by the same distinguished attorneys
with the help of Senator Edmunds, and after the fullest consideration of the same views of Mr. Justice WHITE in his 'dissenting
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opinion, and.still further, after a rehearing, for a third time the majority of the court held the same. He adds: "If you will take
the trouble to look through the Federal Reporter you will find that
possibly nearly every Federal court in this country has accepted
those original decisions-as the final decision of this court as to the
meaning of the act of Congress.
"Now it is laid down in some of the cases, and it is common sense,
that this court is bound to know what everybody else in the community knows, and therefore I say, without hesitation, that everybody knows that there has not been a session of Congress since 1896,
when that original opinion was delivered but that somebody, taking
the opposite view from what the court has said, has applied to Congress to get that law amended; but it never has been amended, and
there is not a man in the country today who does not know that
it
never will be amended by the Congress of the United States to mean
what they wanted Congress to have it mean, and which Congress
refused to have it mean; to get the courts so to construe it.
"In the not very short life that I have passed in this capital and
the public service of the country the most alarming tendency of -this
clay, in my judgment, so far as the safety and integrity of our
institutions are concerned, is the tendency to judicial legislation,
so
that, when men having vast interests are concerned and they can'
not get the law-making power of the country which controls it
to
pass the legislation they desire, the next thing they do is to raise
the
question in some case, to get the court so to construe the Constitution or the statutes as to mean what they want it to mean. That has
not been our practice."
Although it is usually said that debates in a legislative body may
not be resorted to to determine the meaning of a statute,3 4 yet
the
reports of committees may be.'5 It is, however, proper fo: the purposes of review to look into the proceedings of Congress.
Section i, of the original billP' introduced by Senator SHrRIAN
read: "That all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or
combinations between persons or corporations made with a viez,
or
which tend, to prevent full and free competition in the importation,
transportation, or sale," etc., and "all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations between persons or corporations
designed, or which tend, to advance the cost to the consumer of any
such articles, are hereby declared to be against public policy, unlawful and void."
The Senator said: "It does not announce a new principle of law,
3"U. S. v. Trans-Missouri Frt. Ass'n, 166'U. S. 313.
" Church of Holy Trinity v. U. S.. 143 U. S. 4573d5ist Cong. ist Sess., Dec. 4, z889, Senate
Bill No. z, Bills & Debates, p. 69
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to all interstate and international commercial transactions, and have
clothed the United States courts with authority to enforce that doctrine by injunction.. We have put in also a grave penalty." 39 And
Senator EDMUNDS said; "We would frame a bill that should be
clearly within our Constitutional power, that we should make its
definition out of terms that were well known to the law already, and
would leave it to the courts in the first instance to say how far they
could carry it or its definitions as applicable to each particular case
as it might arise."' 0
And Senator EDMUNDS said in reference to monopoly "that we
studied it with whatever little ability we had, and the best answer I
can make is to read from Webster's Dictionary the definition of the
verb 'to monopolize': 'i. To purchase or obtain possession of the
whole of, as a commodity or goods in market, with the view to appropriate or control the exclusive sale of; as to monopolize sugar or
tea.' Like -the Sugar Trust. One man, if he had capital enough,
could do it just as well as two. '2. To engross or obtain by any
means the exclusive right of, especially the right of trading to any
place, or within any country or district; as to monopolize the India
or Levant trade.' The old definition. * * * We thought we had
done the right thing in providing, in the very phrase we did, that if
one person instead of two, by a combination, if one person alone, as
we have heard about the wheat market in Chicago, for instance, did
it, it was just as offensive and injurious to the public interests as if
'4 1
two had combined to do it."
Senator EDMUNDS' definition of monopoly should be noted, es-

pecially the first,-purchase of the whole commodity to control its
sale. He, as does the Chief Justice, assumes that the second definition given, is the old one; this is a mistake, it only goes back to Lord
Coxe; the other, the first one, back fo ARISTOTLt,--and literally
means a "sole seller." ARISTOTLIn says: Thales, the Milesian philosopher, was reproached for his poverty, but "he knew by his skill
in the stars while it was yet winter that there would be a great
harvest of olives in the coming year; so having a little money, he

gave deposits for the use of all the olive-presses in Chios and Miletus,
which he hired at a low price because no one bid against him.. When
the harvest-time came, and many wanted them all at once and of a
sudden, he let them out at any rate he pleased, and made a quantity
of money. He is supposed to have given striking proof of his
wisdom, but, as I was saying, his device for getting money is nothing but .the creation of a monopoly."
" Ib. 31 .
40lb. 315.
41 1b. p. 324.
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So too, "there was a man of Sicily, who having money deposited
with him, bought up all the iron from the iron mines; afterwards,
when the merchants from their various markets came to buy, he
was the only seller, and without much increasing the price he gained
200 per cent. Which when Dionysius heard, he told him he might
take away his money, but that he must not remain in Syracuse. He
had the same idea as Thales; they both contrived to create a monop4'
oly for themselves. And statesmen ought to know these things.
Chief
of
the
the
view
confirm
to
seem
The foregoing statements
Justice; this, however, is only apparent, and a careful study of the
debates leads to a different view. (i) Senator SHERMAN'$ original
bill was aimed at "all ar'rangements, contracts, etc., made with a
view, or which tend to prevent full and free comipetition?' in interstate and foreign commerce; it made these illegal, null and void.
(2) He pointed out that the purchase of property by one person of
another, the formation of partnerships or corporations, to aid production, are not combinations which prevent competition in the legal
sense,-they are not contracts in restraint of trade within the meaning of the common law. (3)He cited cases: "that all combinations
for the purpose of raising or controlling prices of merchandise or
any of the necessaries of life are monopolies,"-"matches here,- and
"itis 'no answer to say that it has reduced the price," for it can "at
any time raise the price to an exorbitant degree ;-43 a secret partnership among the grain dealers in a town,-each firm apparently conducting its own business as if no such partnership existed,--"to control the price of grain, costs of storage and expense of shipment at
such town is in restraint of trade, and void;4" the division of the city
of Chicago by agreement between two gas companies, "allowing each
the exclusive right of supplying gas therein for IOO years, and stipulating that neither would interfere with the business of the other in
its own territory," although "it involved a partial restraint of trade,"
was void as between "corporations engaged in- a public'business in
which the public have an interest," 45 and the purchase of a majority
of the capital stock of the four competing gas companies in Chicago,
by a new corporation incorporated for "the manufacture, sale and
distribution of gas, and to purchase and hold the capital stock of any
gas company in Chicago or elsewhere," builds up "a virtual monopoly in the manufacture' and sale of gas," which is unlawful and the
corporation can be dissolved ;41 and "any combination the tendency
Politics, Bk. I.
"3Richardson v. Buhl (1889), 77 Mich. 632.
" Craft v. McConoughy (1875), 79 DLI.346.
45 Chicago Gas L. Co. v. People's Gas r,. Co., 121 Ill.
531.
"4People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co. (x889), 130 11. 268.
4'
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of which is to prevent competition in its broad and general sense,
and thus at will enhance prices to the detriment of the public is a
legal monopoly.4 7 (4) These -views were not controverted, denied
or questioned, but seemed to be taken for granted by all. And further the debates seem to assume, that for practical purposes, any contract "made with the view and directly tending to prevent full and
free competition" in interstate commerce, since it would affect the
people of at least two states, and might all of them,-would be inherently in unreasonable restraint of trade by the rules of the common law. (5) But the Senator also proposed that the policy of the
States not only as indicated by the decisions but by their statutes as
well, making these things criminal and tortious, should be supplemented by adopting a like policy by the Federal government in
reference to interstate and foreign commerce. (6) The debate was
mostly upon the remedies for these wrongs,--should they be made
criminal, should they be enjoined at the suit of the United States,
should a person not a party to the restraining contract have a civil
remedy for the damage done him, or should these things be held
null, void and unenforcible, by the parties to them, as at common
law? No one proposed the latter alone, but all desired to provide
one or more of the other remedies; and this is why the original bill
was referred-to the Judiciary Committee, and why it reported the
bill in its present form-to extend the policy of the states to interstate and foreign commerce,-to make violations thereof criminal,
clothe the Federal courts with power to enforce this policy by injunction, and give a civil remedy to a person injured by its violation.
(7) So too, because the bill said nothing about monopoly, and would
not prevent cornering the market, -was another objection to it;
hence the judiciary committee added the monopoly section. If
this is correct, then it seems probable that 'every contract,' was
deliberately used to mean what it says; and this seems to be more
than confirmed by the subsequent history set forth in Justice HARLAN'S opinion.
It is not quite clear therefore why the court should in.a case not
requiring it, and when the question was touched upon only incidently
in the briefs,-because it had been considered practically settled for
fifteenyears, suddenly reverse itself, and mount that "unruly horse"public policy-which no court has ever yet successfully ridden and
which will vary as it has heretofore, in matters of this kind, on the
equity side "with the length of the chancellor's foot," and on the
legal side from Hull's "per Dieu, if the plaintiff were here, he should
go to prison till he paid a fine to the King," because he took a bond
"Mr. Justice Barrett, in People v. North River Sugar Ref. C6., 2 Abb. N. C. 164.
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from a dyer not to use his dyer's craft in town for half a year,
to the House of Lords' conclusion that a combination to engross all
the tea trade between Shanghai and Europe, to the exclusion of the
plaintiff, was not unlawful,-so as to give the plaintiff an action for
damages ;49 the court here, however, was careful to point out that
while this was a contract in restraint of trade, it was not unlawful,
so as to give a third party an action for damages; they did not hold
that it was a contract in "reasonable restraint of trade," so that one
party to it would have had an action against another for damages
for refusing to abide by it; they probably would have refused to
enforce it so, because it was in unreasonable restraint of trade."
And it is safe to say that had the case arisen before 1844, the court
would hardly have held under the laissez faire rule of reason sofashionable at the time that the English statutes. did not apply as
they before had been interpreted. It would have been left to Parliament, as it was, to abrogate the statutes and establish a new policy.
However, if hereafter, the common law rule of reason is to apply,
and though this will lead to a sea of uncertainty, if one can judge
-by the conflict in the views of the members of the court, perhaps the
ultimate result will not be greatly different, except to throw a greater
burden on the government in getting at and 'stablishing the facts
in each case. There is not much in the common law rule of reason,
except its uncertainty, to give comfort to any of the large trusts to
classify themselves among the sheep instead of among the goats.
The best statement of the common law, so far as it can be stated at
all, is that made by President TArT, when as judge he rendered the
decision in the Addyston Pipe,Case. ' He said, citing cases in the
note: "Covenants in partial restraint of trade are generally upheld
as valid when they are agreements; (I) by the seller of property or
business not to compete with the buyer in such a way as to derogate
from the value of property or business sold; (2) by a retiring partner not to compete with the firm; (3) by a partner, pending the partnership, not to do anything to interfere, by competition or otherwise,
with the business of the firm; (4) by the buyer of property not to
use the same in competition with the business retained by the seller;and (5) by an assistant, servant or agent not to compete with his
master or employer after the expiration of his time of service. Before such agreements are upheld, however, the court must find that
the restraints attempted thereby are reasonably necessary (1, 2 and
3) to the enjoyment by the buyer of the property, good-will or in-

Is Dier's

Case (,415), Y. B. 2 II. V. f. 5, pl. 26.
" Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor [1892], A. C. 25.
"'Nordenfelt v. Maxim &c. Co. [1894], A. C. 535.
8 Fed. 271.
51 United States v. Addyston &c. Co. (x898),
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terest in the partnership bought; or (4) to the legitimate ends of
the existing partnership; or (5)" to the prevention of possible injury to-the business of the seller from use by the buyer of the
thing sold; or (6) to protection from the danger of loss to the employer's business caused by the unjust use on the part of the employe of the confidential knowledge acquired in such business."
But where the sole object of both parties in makitig the contract as
expressed therein is merely to restrain competition, and enhance or
maintain prices, it would seem that there was nothing to justify or
excuse the restraint, that it would necessarily have a tendency to
monopoly and therefore would be void. In such a case there is. no
measure of what is necessary to the protection of either party except
the vague and varying opinion of judges as to how much, on principles of political economy, men ought to be allowed to restrain
competition. There is in such contracts no main lawful purpose to
subserve which partial restraint is permitted, and by which its reasdnableness is measured, but the sole object is to restrain trade in
order to avoid the competition which it has always bera the policy
of the common law to foster."' 5
12First class:
Mitchel v. Reynoldsc P. Wms. 181; Fowle v. Parke, 131 U. S.
88, 9 Sup. Ct. 658; Nordenfelt v. Maxim-Nordenfelt Co. [1894], App. Cas. 534;
Rousillon v. Rousillon. 14 Ch. Div. 351; Cloth co. v. Lorsont, I. R. 9 Eq. 345; Whittaker v. Howe. . Beav. 383; Match Co. v. Roeber. ro6 N. Y. 473, 13 N. E. 419;
Tode v. Gross. 127 N. Y. 480. 28 N. E.. 469; Beal v. Chase, 31 Mich. 490; Hubbard v. Miller. 27 Mich. zs; National Ben. Co. v. Union Hospital Co., 45 Minn. 272,
47 N. NV. Rep. 8o6; Whitney v. Slayton. 40 Maine 224; Pierce v. Fuller, 8 Mass. 223;
Richards v. Seating Co., 87 Wis. 503, 58 N. W. Rep. 787.
Second class: Tallis v. Tillis. i El. & Bl. 391, and Lange v. Werk, 2 Ohio St.

520.

Third class: Machinery Co. v. Dolph. 238 U. S. 617, 11 Sup. Ct. 412; Machinery
Co. v. Dolph. 28 Fed. Rep. 553; and Matthews v. Associatcd Press, 136 N. Y. 333, 32
N. E. Rep. 98z.
Fourth class: American Strawboard Co. v. Haldeman Paper Co., 83 Fed. Rep. 6r9;
and Hitchcock v. Anthony, 83 Fed. Rep. 779,.both decisions of this court; Navigation
Co. v. Winsor, 20 Wall. 64; Dunlop v. Gregory, xo N. Y. 241; Hodge v. Sloan, 107
N. Y. 244, 17 N. E. Rep. 335.
Fifth class: Homer v. Ashford, 3 Bing. 322; Horner v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735;
Hitchcock v. Coker. 6 Adol. & E. 438; Ward v. Byrne. 5 Mees. & W. 547; Dubowski
v. Goldstein (896), 1 Q. B. 478; Peels v. Saalfeld (r892), 2 Ch. 149; Taylor v. Blanchard, 13 Allen 370; Keefer v. Taylor, 53 Pa. St. 467; Herreshoff v. Boutineau. 17
R. I 3. 19 AtI. Rep. 712.
63Citing: People v. Sheldon, 139 N. Y. 25t; Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal
Co.. 68 Pa. St. 173; Nester v. Brewing Co.. r6z Pa. St. 473; Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35
0. S. 666; Anderson v. Jett, 89 Ky. 375; Chapin v. Brown, 79 Ill. 346; Craft v. McConoughy. 79 Ill. 346; More v. Bennett. 140 I. 69; Association v. Niezerowski, 95
Wis. 129; Vulcan Powder Co. v. Hercules Powder Co.. 96 Cal. Sio; Oil Co. v. Adone,
83 Tex. 65o; Association v. Kock. 14 La. Ann. z68; Hilton v. Eckersley, 6 El. & BlI.
47; Urmston v. Whitelegg, 63 L. T. (N. S.) 455.
See also Iartman v. Park & Sons, 145 Fed. 358; Page, Contracts, § 373; Ripley,
Trusts, Pools & Corporations. Chs. IX. X. 8 Mich. L. Rev. 298 (J. C. Knowlton); 6
Mich. L. Rev. x (S. T. Miller); 3 Mich. L. Rev. x19 (D. M. Fredericksen).
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And in the very recent case of Dr.Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park
Sons Co.," Mr. Justice HUGMES says: "But agreements or combinations between dealers, having for their sole purpose the destruction
of competition and the fixing of prices, are injurious to the public
interest and void. They are not saved by the advantages which the
participants expect to derive from the" enhanced price to the consumer."
The decisions of the Supreme Court under the anti-trust act may
be summarized and classified as follows: (i) Purchase or acquisition of stock of competing corporations by one of the competitbrs
for the purpose of preventing competition or creating a monopoly.
Of this class are the Sugar Trust cases. In the Knight case,5"
the American Sugar Refinery Company, being in control of a large
part of 'the manufactories of refined sugar in the United. States,
purchased all the stock of four competing Philadelphia sugar refineries, giving the American Co a practical monopoly of the refining and sale of sugar in the United States; it was held, by FULLER,
C. J., that "conceding the existence of a monopoly in the manufacture is established," it cannot be suppressed in the mode attempted
in this bill, because manufacturing is not commerce. HARLAN, J.,
dissents.
In the Kissel case,"" the same American Sugar Refining Co., by
Kissel, its agent, without disclosing his principal, loaned a large sum
of 'nioney to S. (who owned more than half the stock of a competing Pennsylvania Co.), and took this stock, with a power of
attorney to vote upon it, as collateral security for the loan, which
was to last for one year. S. did not know the American Co. was
back of K., and was dependent upon the income of this stock to repay the loan. K., at the instigation of the American Co., voted to
close the Pennsylvania Co., and thereby cestroy its business, and
ruin S. Held, this was an illegal conspiracy, violating the Anti-trust
act,-"a partnership for a criminal' purpose,"-per HoLMI.s, J., no
dissent.
Perhaps in this class should also be placed the Northern Securities
case, and the case under review. See'No. (3)below.
(2) Purchase or lease of. competing properties with covenant
from the seller or lessor that he will not compete with the purchaser.
In the Packet case,57 a seller of two river steamboats plying between two places and the intermediate points in the State of Ohio
on the Ohio river, agi-eed not to engage in the packet business for
(1 9 1 1 ), 31

S. C. 376 on 385.

U. S. v. r. C. Knight Co. (189.). i f6 U. S. x; 6o F . 934.
'AU. S. v. Klissel (1910), U.S. -- 31 '. C. 124; 173 Fed. 823.
IT Cincinnati, 1'. B. &c. Packet Co. v. Bay 0Wgo6), 2oo U. S. 179.
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five years between the same points,-held, HoLm.s, J., even if there
is some interference with interstate commerce, it "is insignificant,
and incidental and not the dominant purpose of the agreement" which
relates to intrastate traffic only, and does not violate the Anti-trust
act. No dissent.
In the Cotton Compress case,?s the lessee already owned and controlledalarge number of the cotton compresses in the southern states;
the lessor compress company leased all its property and good will to
the foreign lessee company, with a covenant to discourage all competition with the latter, and itself refrain from engaging in compressing cotton within 50 miles of any plant operated by the lessee,this lease being made in pursuance of a plan t.o draw into one control
the compression business of the cotton producing states. Held,
MCKENNA, J., violates Anti-trust act.

No dissent.

The Banana trust, noted below (7), was of this character also.
(3) Organization of a trust or corporation by former competing
concerns, or by their shareholders, to take over the property or
stock of such concerns in order to prevent competition.
Of this class is the Northern Securities case, 9. where the Securities Company was organized with $4oo,ooo,ooo of capital stock,-$2Ii,ooo,ooo of which it exchanged with the stockholders of the
Great Northern Railroad Co., for practically all of its $I i8,O0O,OOO
capital stock, and likewise exchanged $177,ooo,ooo more of its stock
with the shareholders of the Northern Pacific Railroad Co., for
practically all of its $154,000,000 capital stock,-giving the former
shareholders about $388,ooo,ooo of the. Securities' stock, while the
latter company became the sole shareholder in the two railroad companies, with power to control them and prevent the continuance of
competition between their 5500 mile of lines. Held, HARLAN,
BROWN,f McKENNA, DAY, and BREWER, that this violated the Antitrust act, FULLER, C. J., PECKHAM, HorMEs, and WHITE, JJ., dissenting on the ground that exchange of shares was purchase of
property, and not a combination or contract in restraint of interstate
commerce. Compare the Sugar trust cases, supra, under (i).
In the .subsequent case, 0 arising out of the distribution of the
assets of the Securities Co., under the decree in the original case,
it was held that there was a real purchase of the stock of the railroad companies by the Securities Co.,-and the $I8,ooo,ooo stock
of Great Northern, and $I54,000,ooo

stock of Northern Pacific

should not be returned to the original owners respectively from
68Shawnee Compress Co. v. Anderson (19o8), 209 U. S. 4;3, 28 S. C. 572.
1 U. S. v. Northern Securities Co. (so4), 193 U. S. 197; 120 Fed. zs.
60Harriman v. Northern Securities Co. (1905), 197 U. S. 244; 134 Fqd. 331, 132
Fed. 464.
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whom they were received, but that the tw;o stocks should be divided
pro-rata, among all the shareholders in the Securities company who
should surrender 99 per cent. of the Securities stock,-opinion by
C. J. No dissent.
FuLrtR.,
The case under review belongs to this class.
(4) Agreements to fix or maintain transportation rates on interstate traffic.
61
The cases here are the freight association cases, sufficiently
because the
too,
here
reviewed above. The Securities case belongs
and' para
sale
was
there
if
even
that
held
majority of the court
chase of property,'that would not purge the plain intent to restrain
competition between competing railroads.
In the Packet case, supra, where- the purchaser of the steamboats
agreed to maintain the present rates,-primarily at least on intrastate traffic, there was no violation of the Anti-trust act.
(5) Associations or agreements 'between former competitors not
to compete,-yet otherwise retaining control over their own business.
The Live Stock exchanges at Kansas City, where the State line
runs through the stock yards were held not to violate the Anti-trust
act. In the Hopkins case,' 2 an associafion was formed among those
whose business it was to receive consignments of live stock from
various states, make advances to their owners, feed and care for the
stock, prepare them for sale, and sell them on commission, remitting
to the owners the balance after deducting costs, expenses, and commissions; they fixed uniform commissions, and agreed to deal with
no one who violated rules relating to employment of agents and
sending prepaid telegrams. Held, their business was not interstate
conmnerce,-PECKHAM, J., (HARLAN, J., dissenting).
In the Anderson case, 63 the yard live stock traders, who themselves
bought and sold live stock at the Kansas City stock yards, associated
together, and agreed not to recognize any one not a member as a
yard trader, or employ any one to buy or sell for him unless he had
a certificate from the exchange, or pay any buyer or seller any fee
for buying or selling for him. Held, such agreement was not in
restraint of, nor an attempt to monopolize, interstate commerce,
even if its members are engaged in such commerce.'
In-the Pipe Trust cases,0 4 ii was held that an agreement among a
large number of the companies manufacturing iron pipe in the
United States, fixing prices to the public by a committee, dividing
61U. S. v. Trans-Mo. rrt. Ass'n (z897), x66 U. S. 290; 58 Fed. 58; 53 Fed. 440; U.
S. v. Joint Traffic Ass'n (s898), x7 U S. SoS; 89 red. 1020, 76 Fed. 89S.
v. U. S. (1898), 17z U. S. 578; 84 Fed. xoz8, 82 Fed. 529.
- Hopkins
"Anderson v. U. S. (1898), 171 U. S. 604; 8- red. 998.
4 Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. U. S. (1899), 175 U. S. 2i; S5 Fed. 271, 78 Fed. 712.
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territory, and pooling profits, violates the Anti-trust act,-per PEcKHAM, J: No dissent. The same combination was likewise held to be
"
illegal in the Chattanooga Foundry Works case, by HoLMES, J.,
matters.
two of the court dissenting on other
In the Meat Trust case, 0 it was held that a combination of the
dominating members of dealers in fresh meats throughout the United
States to bid in conjunction with and not againsf one another for
live stock, in order to regulate prices, to restrict shipments, and to
get less than lawful rates from railroads, violates the Anti-trust
act,-Homs, J. No dissent.
The Packet case is given above under (2).
The Wall Paper trust, T by organizing a selling corporation to fix
and maintain prices for its members and limit production, was assumed to be illegal. See below under (6). So too, the Banana
trust. See below under (7).
(6) Agreements between seller and buyer that the latter will
resell to public only on terms named by the original seller.
Thus where the patentee of harrows sold the. right to manufacture and sell the same, to a licensee, and agreed to license no one
else, and the licensee agreed to make and sell the harrows at a price
fixed by patentee, and to -sell no others; the agreement does not
violate the Anti-trust act,- --8P PEcKHAM, J. No dissent.
But where the wholesale dealers in tiles, etc., in one state, associate with the makers of such tiles in other states, whereby the
makers agree not to sell to non-members and the wholesale dealers
agree not to purchase from non-members, and not to sell at all at
less than the list prices agreed upon, to non-members,-more than
50o higher than to members, is an association which violates the
act,-- 0- 9 per P4CKHAM, J. No dissent.
However, a contract between- a board of trade and a telegraph
company, whereby the board agrees to furnish quotations of the
prices of grain, on condition that the telegraph company will communicate such prices only to persons having contractual relations
with and approved by the board of trade, and not to bucket shops,
70
does not .violate the Anti-trust act, as a contract in restraint of
trade,-per HoILEs, J. (HARLAN, BREWER, and DAY, JJ., dissenting).
* Chattanooga F. & P. Works v. Atlanta (19o6).
"Swift v. U. S. (x9o5), 196 U. S. 37S; r22 Fed.
O Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Voight (19o9),
Fed. 939.
63Bement v. National Harrow Co. (1902), 186 U.
61Montague & Co. v. Lowry (1904), 193 U. S.
Fed. 8r7.
"Board of Trade v. Christie &c. Co. (19o5), 198
608.

203 U. S. 390, 27 S. C. 65.

529.
212 U. S. 227, 29 S. C. 280; 148
S. 7o.
38; iiS Fed. 27, xo6 Fed. 38, 98
U. S. 236; x39 Fed. 496. i2

Fed.
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In the Wall Paper trust, in addition to what is stated above (5)
the selling agency fixed prices to wholesalers, to retailers, and to the
public, and required the wholesalers to agree, to sell to retailers only
on the terms' fixed, and the retailers to sell only to the public at the
prices fixed by the seller. - Held, per HARLAN, J., to violate Antitrust act (HOLM-Es, BREWER and WIrIr, JJ., dissent on the ground

that a wholesale dealer who had purchased a bill of goods from the
trust was not in a position to contest the validity of its existence).
The same sort of an agreement whereby the maker and seller of
a proprietary medicine made under a secret process undertook to
fix the prices to wholesalers, and by them to the retailers, and by
the latter to the public, and that such wholesalers should sell only
to such retailers as were approved by the proprietor violates the
Anti-trust act ;71 opinion by HUGiES, J. (HoLisEs, J., dissenting).
"
So too, in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strais,7
the district court held
that Bobbs-N'Ierrill Co. could not prevent the sale below a specified
price, of a copyrighted book by the purchaser,-the Book trust, composed of the American Publishers' Ass'n, and the Am. Booksellers'
Ass'n, a combination controlling the sale and fixing the price of 90
per cent of the copyrighted books, aj--l blacklisting dealers who
would not come into the association,-eiken though it was an unlawful trust, as held by the court. This was affirmed, as a restraint on
alienation, the copyright of a book not giving the same right as a
patent of an article' but the Supreme Court'did not deem it necessary
to pass on the validity of the Book trust.
(7) Combinations to prevent others from carrying on their trade
in the usual way.
By -force, threats, violence, and actual physical obstruction, preventing the movement of sleeping cars engaged in interstate commerce, as in the Debs case.j Held, by lower court, to violate the
Anti-trust act, but affirmed by the Supreme Court, on broader
grounds as interfering with the movement of the mails, etc,--per
BREWER, J. No dissent.
So too, a boycott by the hatters union of 9000 members, in combination with the American Federation of Labor of 1,4oo,ooo mem-

bers, of the manufacturer of hats to be transported and sold across
state lines whose shop the Union seeks to unionize, by preventing
purchasers from reselling for fear of strikes, and loss of customers,
because of the wide publication in the Union papers of the names
"1Dr.Miles Mled. Co. v. Park & Sons Co. (igx ), - U. S. - 31 S. C. 376; 164 Fed.
803; $cc Hartman v. John 1). Park, X45 Fed. 358.
'221o U. S. 339, 28 S. C. 722; 147 Fed. 15; '39 Fed. 155; 131 Fed. 530.
3In re Debs (t895), 158 U. S. 564; 64 Fed. 724.
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of unfair dealers, is a combination in restraint of interstate commerce, in violation of the Anti-trust act,- 74 per FuLaR, C. J. No
dissent..
In the Banana trust case,7 5 the trust organized in the United States,
with an intent to control competition and monopolize the banana
trade, bought out many competitors, who promised not to compete,
acquired the stock of others, contracted with still others limiting the
quantity to be purchased, and organized a selling corporation to
fix and maintain prices. Plaintiff, a United States citizen, acquired
a banana plantation in U. S. of Columbia, and proceeded to construct a railroad to it. The trust induced the Costa Rica government
to prevent by its soldiers, the plaintiff from completing his road,
procured a fraudulent judgment as to the title to the land, and forcibly ejected plaintiff, and destroyed his business. Held, although
the parties were engaged in the foreign banana trade of the United
States, the wrongful acts occurred outside the territory of the United
States, and the Federal courts had no jurisdiction to give relief,per HoLmEs, J., all concur.
(8) Miscellaneous.
A municipal ordinance specifying that Trinidad Lake asphalt, a
foreign product, shall .be used in the pavement of a city street, and
thereby preventing competitive bidding does not violate the Antitrust act,- 7 per DAY, J. No dissent. Corporations are not protected under the provisions of the 5th amendment of the Constitution from having their agents testify or their books produced, in a
criminal prosecution against them under the Anti-trust act, on the
ground that a criminal cannot be required to testify against himself;
this privilege is. personal to the witness called on to testify. Such
corporations, however, are protected against unreasonable searches
and seizures."
The facts show that the defendant in the case under review, has
been a party to contracts or combinations held illegal under most
of the foregoing classes, but particularly of forming a trust or combination, under (3), above, and thereby, and by unlawful agreements with transportation companies, secured illegal preferences,
practically as efficient as a special grant from the government would
be; they have been, and have intended to be parties to combinations
in restraint of interstate commerce, and have attempted to monop71 Loewe v. Lawlor (1907), 208 U. S. 274, 28 S. C. 30!; 142 Fed. 2z6, 130 Fed. 633.
5
" American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. (1909), 213 U. S. 347, 29 S. C. 511; 166

Fed. 7 26r.
8 Field v. Barber Asphalt Co. (1904), 194 U. S. 618; u17-red. 925.
WTHale v. H-enkel (i9o6), 2o U. S. 43; McAlister v. Henkel, 2o U. S. 99; Nelson
v. U. S. (x9o6), 201 U. S. 92; Alexander v. U. S. (igo6), 20r U. S. 117.
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olize, and have monopolized, such trade and commerce.. And in this
way they have
* * * Engrossed and piled up
The cankeredI heaps of strange achieved gold."
There is not much in the common law rule of reason, nor in the
cases reviewed, to furnish much of aid or comfort-to such existing
institutions as are similar to those that have been challenged in, the
courts heretofore.
H. L. WiLGus:
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